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This paper addresses one of the intricacies of international competition law enforcement, 
namely the diversification of legal instruments used for bilateral cooperation. To name only a 
few: why are memorandums of understanding, dedicated competition cooperation agreements, 
competition law provisions in free trade agreements, and policy dialogues used in parallel to 
attain bilateral cooperation on competition law enforcement? What is the added legal value of 
each instrument? Is their added value to be found in political considerations? The argument put 
forward in this paper is that a parallel can be drawn between the internal and external functions 
of competition law. As competition law is not a goal as such within the EU, but in general 
serves the optimal functioning of the Single Market, the function of international cooperation 
on competition law matters is not solely to be found in competition considerations, but serves 
other goals as well. Therefore, the fact that a number of different objectives are pursued may 
explain the use of several distinct instruments for cooperation on competition law issues. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Diversification of legal means in the EU for bilateral cooperation on 
competition law 
As was recently demonstrated by the blocking of the Deutsche Börse AG/NYSE 
Euronext merger, the European Commission1 deals with cases that go beyond the 
territorial scope of the European Union (EU), necessitating cooperation with the 
competition authorities of third countries.2 This paper looks at the diversification of 
legal instruments used for this bilateral competition law enforcement cooperation.3 
More specifically, the questions raised are: why are Memorandums of Understanding 
(MoUs), Dedicated Competition Cooperation Agreements, competition law provisions 
in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and Policy Dialogues used in parallel to attain 
bilateral cooperation on competition law enforcement? What is the added legal value of 
each instrument? Is their added value to be found in political considerations? These 
questions will be framed in the broader discussion on the optimal form of international 
cooperation on competition law, if such a form exists.  
                                                                                                                                         
*  Valerie Demedts is a PhD candidate and academic assistant at the European Institute (Jean Monnet Centre 
of Excellence) of Ghent University in Belgium. Comments are welcomed on Valerie.Demedts@Ugent.be. 
1  Herein ‘the Commission’. 
2  Press Release, ‘Mergers: Commission prohibits proposed merger between Deutsche Börse AG and NYSE 
Euronext – frequently asked questions’, 1 February 2012, MEMO/12/60, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/60&format=HTML&aged=0&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en, accessed February 2012.   
3  The term instrument covers both legally binding treaties or agreements as non-binding recommendations or 
guidelines.  
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The main focus of the paper will be on bilateral cooperation. The multilateral track will 
be touched upon, but initiatives such as the OECD Competition Committee and 
Global Forum on Competition, the International Competition Network (ICN), 
UNCTAD or the attempts to include competition matters in the WTO, will not be 
dealt with. The multilateral efforts in the field of competition law and the institutional 
forms they take are very important developments. However, this paper will focus on 
the observation that – contrary to multilateral initiatives that have noticeably distinct 
roles – the legal instruments for bilateral cooperation take on a wide variety of forms, 
although with an apparently similar purpose.4 Also falling outside the scope of this 
paper are the agreements with candidate countries, or agreements concluded in the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. These agreements also contain competition provisions, but due to their 
very specific context, will not be analysed in this paper.  
Questions will be answered from an EU perspective, because apart from the United 
States of America, the EU has developed one of the most mature competition regimes 
in the world. Secondly, EU insights in international competition law cooperation may 
be useful, as competition law in the EU itself is applied transnationally. A final factor is 
that the EU has been very active in international negotiations on competition law and 
the internationalisation of competition law and policy.5  
1.2 A global and under-researched issue 
A first reason why legal diversification in bilateral competition cooperation deserves to 
be highlighted relates to the importance of international competition law cooperation in 
itself. The emergence of the global market necessitates the creation of rules adapted to 
a globalised context, detached from territorialism. As protectionist influences often 
obstruct this type of evolution, cooperation to simplify international enforcement of 
national rules constitutes a necessary safeguard, as rules are without value if they cannot 
be effectively enforced. The impact of globalisation will be further discussed below (see 
2.3).  
What makes this field of research, in particular the diversity of bilateral legal 
instruments for international competition cooperation, even more interesting, is the 
fact that it is a fairly under-researched area. The debates on international cooperation 
on competition law issues mostly focus on different peculiarities, such as the discussion 
concerning bilateral versus multilateral cooperation, or the debate revolving around 
convergence versus cooperation (see 2.4). It is nevertheless also interesting to note that 
                                                                                                                                         
4  Briefly put, the OECD focuses mainly on developed countries, UNCTAD’s work is more centred on 
developing countries, the ICN is a virtual network on the agency-level, focusing only on competition 
matters and not trade issues, and the WTO is a binding platform. Of course this should be nuanced. 
For a more detailed overview of the characteristics of these platforms, see Damro, ‘The new trade 
politics and EU competition policy: shopping for convergence and cooperation’, 2006 13(6) Journal of 
European Public Policy, 867-886. This type of ‘diversification’ is not noticeable in bilateral cooperation 
instruments.  
5  For an overview of this international action of the EU, see Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU 
Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
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the EU is currently negotiating second generation bilateral competition agreements (see 
3.2) with Switzerland and Canada, while at the same time negotiating MoUs with India 
and China, and it includes competition provisions in its bilateral FTAs.6 What are the 
causes of this differentiation and what are the benefits and flaws of each instrument? 
These questions have not yet been fully answered from a legal perspective. A clearer 
view on this diversification could help improve the effectiveness of international 
cooperation on competition issues, by making the flaws and benefits of each approach 
more explicit, and being a cause for reflexion. Are clear goals of cooperation stated in 
advance, and is the legal instrument to attain that goal chosen accordingly? Or do other 
considerations determine the preferred instrument for cooperation? This paper will try 
to bring some clarity to this matter, aimed at facilitating the choice of instrument in the 
future.      
Apparently, the Commission itself is aware of this problem. According to a 
Commission official:  
The Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission (‘DG 
Competition’) is now adopting a more strategic approach towards international 
agreements tailoring the instrument to the real needs of the relationship and to 
facts such as the size and importance of the country’s economy, the intensity of the 
trade and investment relationship with the country concerned and the degree of 
maturity of its competition regime.7 
This implies that the diversification of existing instruments is not caused by the need to 
tailor the agreements to the real needs of the relationship. Another question that comes 
to mind when reading this statement is who defines the ‘needs’ of the relationship? 
What are these ‘needs’ and from whose perspective are they seen? This paper would 
like to provide some clarity by conducting a comparative analysis with a narrower focus 
than is typically adopted. More precisely it will link the needs of international 
enforcement and the goals of international cooperation with the legal instruments used 
to attain this cooperation.  
1.3 Overview  
The paper will first elaborate on the context of international cooperation in the field of 
competition law by briefly explaining its necessity, benefits, and origins. Then a short 
overview will be given of the main axis around which current debates on international 
competition law cooperation revolve. The next section will analyse the similarities and 
differences in the legal means to achieve bilateral cooperation in competition law 
enforcement. It will clarify the main instruments by elaborating on their general content 
and legal value. Section four will then identify the possible standards of evaluation 
against which the added legal and political value of each instrument can be assessed. 
Section five contains the conclusion.  
                                                                                                                                         
6  Interview with Commission official, November 2011.  
7  Valle, 'International Agreements Regarding Cooperation in the Field of Competition: The New Strategy of 
the European Commission', (2010) 1(2) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 155, 156. 
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2. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW COOPERATION 
It has been said that any system of law is only as effective as its enforcement 
mechanism and that the ‘life blood’ of competition law lies in its effective 
enforcement.8 In the field of competition law, the effectiveness of this enforcement 
mechanism can be completely undone if it lacks an international character. This aspect 
of competition law enforcement therefore cannot be ignored. Why is this international 
dimension so valuable and how did it develop?  
2.1 The need for international cooperation in the field of competition law 
International competition law enforcement is necessitated first of all by globalisation.9 
Looking at the international section of the website of Directorate General (DG) 
Competition, one is confronted with the heading ‘Facing the challenges of 
globalisation’.10 The Commission explains its international engagements through the 
need for effective enforcement in a globalised economy, where a majority of companies 
operate across borders, thus affecting several distinct national markets.11 The most 
important anticompetitive practices that have an international effect deserve to be 
mentioned. Firstly, there is the existence of international cartels. While no concrete 
recent data on the Commission’s international cooperation efforts in the fight against 
international cartels are publicly available, the importance the Commission places on 
fighting international cartels is clear from many of its formal and informal 
communications. For example, competition Commissioner Almunia invited his 
audience to ‘consider that at present my services are investigating over 25 cartel 
cases, … only about half of them are limited to Europe in scope.’12 Given the increase 
in multinational firms, and due to the potential existence of exclusive distribution 
agreements in the territory of one state, such agreements can have a significant impact 
on an international level.13 Also, multi-jurisdictional mergers are becoming increasingly 
common.14 Again, the rise of multinational firms and the global economy increase the 
emergence of this type of merger dramatically. As increasing economic liberalisation 
leads to the removal of trade barriers, this creates fresh incentives for anti-competitive 
behaviour by firms becoming more vulnerable to foreign competition. Competition 
                                                                                                                                         
8  Yeung, Securing compliance: a principled approach, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2004, 3.  
9  In the sense of a globally interdependent economy. Steenbergen, ‘Competition and trade policy and the 
challenge of globalization’, in Govaere, Quick & Bronckers (eds), Trade and Competition law in the EU and 
beyond, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, 3.  
10  European Commission Competition, International, ‘Facing the challenges of globalisation’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/overview/index_en.html, accessed April 2012.  
11  Ibid.   
12  Speech Almunia, 'Cartels: the priority in competition enforcement', 15th International Conference on 
Competition: a spotlight on cartel prosecution, Berlin, 2011; also, very recently, see Speech Italianer, ‘Zero 
tolerance for international cartels’, ICN Cartel Workshop, Bruges, 2011, both at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_theme_1.html, accessed December 2011. Further 
references can be found in the Commission’s annual Management Plans, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/index_en.htm.  
13  Papadopoulos, op.cit., 42. 
14  Ibid., 43.  
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laws thus need to supplement this liberalisation in order to protect its effects, and 
cooperation is required to avoid gaps in the legislation or its enforcement.15 
This necessity is not only put forward by the Commission, it is also supported by legal 
doctrine, confirming that assistance between states, for instance during investigations, 
proceedings or enforcement action, is essential for the effective enforcement of 
national competition laws.16 It is recognised that companies as well as business 
transactions have become global, and that the effects of such global transactions cannot 
be confined to one jurisdiction.17 Therefore, international cooperation to ensure the 
competitiveness of these transactions has become a necessity.  
Another factor explaining the need for (increased) international cooperation on 
competition matters is the proliferation of competition laws. Even though competition 
law is a relatively young branch of law,18 the first competition laws having been enacted 
in 1889 in Canada and in 1923 in Europe (Germany),19 today over a hundred countries 
have competition laws in force.20 This phenomenon increases the risk of different 
national laws being applicable to the same case. These legislations may be based on 
different legal or economic standards, resulting in conflicting or divergent outcomes.21 
Although international competition cooperation does not solve this problem entirely, it 
can foster greater understanding of different competition systems and can cause 
competition authorities to take into account considerations of other competition 
authorities.  
Not only conflicting outcomes are a concern, efficiency considerations should also be 
taken into account. International competition cases will often be treated simultaneously 
by several competition authorities.22 In order to avoid a duplication of effort by 
competition authorities and to reduce the procedural burden on the companies 
involved, competition authorities should communicate with each other and coordinate 
their investigations to the largest possible extent. For instance, in the case of multi-
jurisdictional mergers, one procedural problem consists of the fact that several national 
notification procedures with different deadlines and requirements will have to be 
                                                                                                                                         
15  Basedow, ‘Competition policy in a globalized economy: from extraterritorial application to harmonization’, 
in Neumann & Weigand (eds), The International Handbook of Competition, Cheltenham, Elgar, 2004, 321. 
16  Ibid, 325. 
17  Dieckmann, ‘The benefits of cooperation between competition authorities’, Inaugural symposium of the 
Competition Policy Research Center, Tokyo, 2003, 1, http://www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/DP/CPDP-9-E.pdf, 
accessed December 2011.   
18  In 2004, over eighty countries had a form of competition legislation, of which more than two-third had 
taken effect only since 1992. Basedow, op.cit., 321. 
19  Papadopoulos, op.cit., 9-12.  
20  Asian Development Bank, Competition Law Toolkit, ‘Countries that have adopted systems of competition 
law’, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/OGC-Toolkits/Competition-Law/complaw030000.asp, 
accessed January 2012.   
21  Papadopoulos, op.cit., 44. 
22  Dieckmann, op.cit., 10.  
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fulfilled, subjecting the undertakings involved to both additional costs and legal 
unpredictability.23  
These two problems can be described as consequences of ‘over-regulation’, in the sense 
that they are caused by the applicability of more than one set of national competition 
rules. However, under-regulation can occur as well. Substantive law that is too lenient, 
restrictions in its scope of application or procedural enforcement difficulties can cause 
gaps in the protection of competition.24 Companies engaging in anti-competitive 
behaviour can benefit from these gaps and undermine the entire competition system. 
Again, international cooperation can help overcome this problem.  
2.2 Benefits of international competition law cooperation  
The advantages of international competition cooperation by facing the challenges 
mentioned above, can be summarised as follows: a better use of resources, avoidance 
of conflicts with other laws and rulings and a more predictable and (cost-) efficient 
outcome, which is beneficial to the business environment.25 
In a broader perspective, cooperation can also stimulate a learning process that can lead 
to a more mature and sophisticated competition system. Regular interaction can lead to 
convergence in the economic and legal analysis of competition cases, and in this way 
can reduce the risk of incoherent rulings. Competition authorities can benefit from the 
experience that another competition authority may have with a particular market or 
problem, even when they are not working on the same case. By stimulating regular 
contact between different competition authorities, a close working relationship and 
mutual confidence in each other’s capabilities is encouraged.26 This can play an 
important role in generating deeper cooperation in the future.  
Another benefit of cooperation, especially for younger or less established competition 
authorities, is that international cooperation can – paradoxically – enhance their 
autonomy vis-à-vis politics, judges, and firms. When different national competition 
authorities come to conflicting outcomes in cases, ‘[t]hen, governments may try to 
intervene; firms can choose forums; and judges get the ultimate say.’27 If however they 
cooperate, and their decisions are ‘backed’ by other authorities, this provides the 
decisions with more authority and will make the competition authorities less 
institutionally dependent.  
                                                                                                                                         
23  Papadopoulos, op.cit., 43. In 1989 the Gillette/ Wilkinson merger was notified in fourteen jurisdictions. In 
1999 the Exxon/Mobil merger was notified in twenty jurisdictions (Papadopoulos, op.cit., 91). It must 
however be noted that these transactions took place before the EU Merger Regulation, which noticeably 
simplified the matter (ibid., 43).  
24  Basedow, op.cit., 322. 
25  Dieckmann, op.cit., 2. 
26  Ibid., 5-6. 
27  Blauberger, ‘The governance of overlapping jurisdictions – How international cooperation enhances the 
autonomy of competition authorities’, Transtate Working Papers no.102, Bremen, Staatlichkeit im Wandel, 
2009, 1.  
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There are also less idealistic benefits to international cooperation for the EU, such as 
more effective and efficient enforcement of EU competition rules, fairer treatment of 
EU companies in foreign markets, and the creation of a level-playing field between EU 
companies and their foreign competitors.28  
The remark should be made that this section has dealt with the benefits of international 
competition cooperation in general, not the way in which this cooperation should 
happen.  
2.3 Origins of international competition law enforcement cooperation 
As state sovereignty based on territorial integrity has been a central given in the 
international system since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648,  how did states, competition 
authorities, and also the EU, reach the conclusion that they should cooperate with one 
another and to some extent allow other states to interfere with anticompetitive actions 
taking place on their territory?  
2.3.1 Extraterritoriality 
As already touched upon in section 2.1, restrictions of competition within a state can be 
caused by anticompetitive behaviour situated outside the territory of that state. For 
instance, foreign firms may decide to divide a national market between them or fix 
prices for that market, or a foreign firm may hold a dominant position and abuse it in 
another state. The first strategy of states (and the EU) to deal with this type of situation 
was to unilaterally apply their laws extraterritorially. It thus needed to be determined to 
what extent these ‘foreign’ situations could be governed by national rules and to what 
extent they fell under the jurisdiction of the national authorities.29 The extraterritorial 
application of laws is not regulated (formally or informally) in a uniform manner.30 
While this paper does not offer the framework to discuss all different approaches in 
detail, the situation in the EU will be clarified briefly.  
The main articles concerning competition law in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), Articles 101 and 102 TFEU,31 do not mention whether they 
apply extraterritorially. Therefore, the Court of Justice of the EU (the Court), often 
confirming Commission practice, has developed their extraterritorial application in its 
case-law.32 Three legal doctrines have been put forward, two of which were explicitly 
confirmed by the Court. The first doctrine, the economic entity doctrine, was based on the 
nationality of the undertakings engaging in anticompetitive behaviour.33 Evidently this 
                                                                                                                                         
28  Valle, op.cit., 155. 
29  Jones & Sufrin, EC Competition Law - Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed, New York, Oxford University Press, 
2008, 1356.  
30  For a detailed description of these four types, see Basedow, op.cit., 323. 
31  Article 101 & 102 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115 of 9 May 2008, 0001-0388. 
32  Geradin, Reysen, & Henry, 'Extraterritoriality, comity, and cooperation in EU competition law', in Guzman 
(ed), Cooperation, comity, and competition policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, 24. 
33  It was applied by the Court in the Dyestuffs case, where the Court confirmed its competence by holding 
parent companies from third countries liable for the anti-competitive behaviour of their EU subsidiaries 
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theory has its limits, as it cannot be applied to assume jurisdiction over purely non-
European players distorting the Single Market.34 Therefore an alternative doctrine was 
developed, the implementation doctrine. This doctrine finds its origins in the territoriality 
principle, and confers jurisdiction to the EU over conduct having a sufficiently close 
link to its territory.35 The core of the doctrine is that in case agreements or practices are 
implemented within the EU and trade between member states is affected, they fall 
under the scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, irrespective of their geographic 
origin,36 or whether or not EU subsidiaries, (sub-)agents or branches were used. This 
was clarified by the Court in the Woodpulp case.37 What actions constitute an 
implementation was clarified in the Gencor case, stating that the mere sale in the EU is an 
implementation act, irrespective of where the sources of supply or the production 
plants are located.38 The final doctrine is recognised by the Commission, but 
disagreement exists on whether it is generally confirmed by the Court, which prefers to 
rely on the two other doctrines, as they are less politically sensitive.39 This doctrine is 
the effects doctrine, also based on the territoriality principle and extending jurisdiction to 
situations where the effects in the EU of foreign anticompetitive actions are immediate, 
reasonably foreseeable, and substantial.40  
While noticeably widening the scope of jurisdiction, extraterritorial application of the 
law does have its obvious limits. In a globalised economy, with a proliferation of 
competition laws, companies will often find themselves subject to different national 
laws, creating an excessive burden for companies, for instance in the case of an 
international merger when complying with all the formalities of the different affected 
states. Moreover, extraterritorial application of national laws can result in irreconcilable 
remedies and diplomatic problems can arise.41 Another limitation is that in order for 
extraterritorial enforcement to be effective, very often the assistance of other states will 
                                                                                                                                         
over which they had control. ECJ, 14 July 1972, Case 48-69 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission of the 
European Communities, [1972] ECR 619, paras 130-132, 135.  
34  Geradin, Reysen, & Henry, op.cit., 26. 
35  Ibid., p. 25, fn. 16. 
36  Ibid., p. 26. 
37  ECJ, 27 September 1988, Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and 
others v Commission of the European Communities, [1988] ECR 5193, paras 16-17. (Wood Pulp) 
38  CFI, 25 March 1999, Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, [1999] ECR II-753, 
para 87.  
39  Geradin, Reysen, & Henry, op.cit., 27-28. 
40  Gencor, para. 87, 90. This doctrine was originally developed in the U.S., in the well-known Alcoa case (United 
States v. Aluminium Co. Of America 148F. 2d 416 (2 Cir.1945)).  
41  Jones & Sufrin, op.cit., 1357. This explains the phenomenon of blocking statutes. In the context of excessive 
extraterritorial application of national laws by the US, not imposing any self-restraint, blocking statutes were 
adopted by other states in order to make discovery more difficult. Swaine, 'Cooperation, Comity, and 
Competition Policy: United States', in Guzman (ed), Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2011, 10. Through this type of statute, states hoped that by forbidding their 
national firms to provide documents to foreign competition authorities or courts, those courts will renounce 
to enforce their order, respecting the prohibition. Zanettin, op.cit., 51. For more information on blocking 
statutes, see Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the International Level, Portland, Hart Publishing, 
2002,  49-52.  
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still be needed, for instance during the proceedings, in gathering evidence or during the 
enforcement.42  
2.3.2 First step towards cooperation: the OECD recommendation 
The next step was thus to find a solution to address these problems, and this solution 
was found in international cooperation.43 Evidently, considering the sensitivity of 
competition law for states,44 this cooperation only developed gradually, and the debate 
is not over yet (see 2.4). 
This essay does not seek to provide a detailed overview of the history of international 
cooperation on competition issues.45 Nevertheless, the issuing of a set of 
recommendations concerning cooperation between member countries on 
anticompetitive practices affecting international trade by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1967 is important to mention.46 
These recommendations have been revised on several occasions, most recently in 
1995.47 They have certainly demonstrated their value. The content of many (bilateral) 
cooperation agreements strongly resembles the content of the recommendations.48 The 
recommendations contain detailed provisions on notification, exchange of information, 
consultation and conciliation. An interpretative appendix has also been added to bring 
extra clarity.49 As recommendations, however, they do not have any binding legal value. 
A subsequent step was then to incorporate the recommendations into more strict legal 
instruments, and to tailor them to the needs of the parties (see section 3).  
2.4 Current debates 
After having reviewed the origins and early evolution of competition law cooperation, it 
is time to look at the current situation. Before analysing some of the existing legal 
instruments used for bilateral competition cooperation, it is important to point out that 
cooperation is not the only option, and there is more than one way to do it. Today, a 
                                                                                                                                         
42  Basedow, op.cit., 324-325. 
43  Jones & Sufrin, op.cit., 1387. 
44  Indeed, competition policy is closely linked to trade policy and industrial policy, causing national market-
sensitivities and political interference to emerge. 
45  This started already in 1927 in the Preparatory Committee of the World Economic Conference, established 
under the auspices of the League of Nations. Report of the OECD Committee on competition law and 
policy – Making international markets more efficient through ‘positive comity’ in competition law 
enforcement (OECD report on positive comity), DAFFE/CLP(99)19, 1999, 7, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/3/2752161.pdf, accessed January 2012. For some historic overview, see 
Papadopoulos, op.cit., and Gerber, Global Competition – Law, markets, and globalization, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010.  
46  OECD Recommendations and Best Practices, Revised Recommendation of the Council concerning 
Cooperation between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices affecting International Trade, C (95) 
130/FINAL, 1995,  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/42/21570317.pdf, accessed January 2012.   
47  More precisely in 1973, 1979, 1986, and 1995. Ibid. 
48  In a later stage, the recommendations have been influenced by the existing competition cooperation 
agreements. Zanettin, op.cit., 56.  
49  Ibid.  
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strong debate continues concerning the best way forward for competition law on a 
global level. In the author’s view, current discussions revolve around three main axis. 
These axis are not to be seen as distinct from each other, but rather intertwining.  
2.4.1 Multilateral versus bilateral cooperation  
The discussion on multilateral versus bilateral cooperation naturally concerns the 
number of parties that should be involved in cooperation. Some of the most recurring 
arguments for and against both tracks will be mentioned. As the benefits of one track 
will often be linked to the drawbacks of the other track, these two opponents will be 
dealt with together.    
For Bilateral / Against Multilateral 
As there are only two parties involved in bilateral cooperation, it is clear that this 
environment is more beneficial to create trust between the parties and to promote an 
intense level of continuous cooperation and interaction. In the same vein, it is logical to 
assume that cooperation and interaction will in general be more superficial in 
multilateral frameworks, as there are more and often more diverse partners involved 
than in the case of bilateral cooperation, where the chance is higher that parties are 
more similar. In a multilateral framework, developed and less developed countries, in 
general and with regard to their experience with competition law, will be involved.50 As 
there is a greater matter of trust between more similar parties in bilateral cooperation, 
this may also increase the chances of an evolution towards substantial and procedural 
convergence.  
On the other hand, in case of bilateral cooperation between partners that are rather 
distinct, this framework is beneficial for clauses involving technical assistance.51 As 
technical assistance is both time and resource consuming, it is clear that this kind of 
commitment is more difficult to offer in a multilateral context.  
Considering the sensitive nature of competition policy to nation-states – it being closely 
linked to other policy areas such as industrial policy and trade – and the differing levels 
of experience with it, it is foreseeable that in a diverse multilateral framework the 
chance to reach agreement on certain issues is much smaller than in a bilateral context. 
Many parties do not even agree on the goal(s) of competition law and its substantial 
functions, which is the common basis needed to work out further issues.52 What would 
be agreed upon would reflect only a lowest common denominator and could have a 
perverse effect on the development of a sound competition policy.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
50  See for instance the member countries of the OECD or the WTO, at http://www.oecd.org/pages/ 
0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html and http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
tif_e/org6_e.htm respectively, accessed January 2012.  
51  For an overview of technical assistance clauses in bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements from 1976 
to 2009, see Papadopoulos, op.cit., 56-57.  8 Out of 27 agreements contained such clauses.   
52  Trittel, ‘Is a multilateral Framework Necessary?’, WTO Regional Workshop on Competition Policy, Cape 
Town, 22-24 February 2001, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/wtocapetown.pdf, accessed 
December 2011.  
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For Multilateral / Against Bilateral 
As mentioned before, more diverse partners will be involved in multilateral discussions. 
This also has positive implications. Not only does it allow to learn from a broader range 
of experiences, it also offers less developed countries, who would not be a selected 
partner for bilateral cooperation, or would not have sufficient negotiation powers, to be 
involved and have the chance to benefit of the experience and expertise of others, and 
coordinate their actions with other less developed countries.53  
Also, a true global competition culture can only be attained when many countries are 
involved. If a certain degree of convergence could be attained, even if it is a superficial 
one, the geographical scope would be much broader than in a bilateral context. As the 
economy becomes more and more globally integrated, bilateral agreements do 
encounter their limitations. A proliferation of bilateral agreements in the long term 
might prove to be counter-effective and confusing.54  
General Remarks 
As mentioned, bilateral agreements are only concluded with a limited number of 
selected partners, but multilateral forums as well have their disadvantages. Some 
regional groupings have limited membership, while others have a small geographical 
scope. Others have a substantive limitation, for instance, WTO and UNCTAD 
cooperation will only involve competition issues with a direct trade dimension.  
Considering the relatively young age of competition law, the great diversity between 
countries that have a competition policy, and their national sensitivities, a multilateral 
agreement that is more than the lowest common denominator, is hard to imagine. 
Therefore bilateral agreements appear to be the correct way to move forward at the 
moment, where appropriate in a network-environment. This appears to have been the 
evolution after the failure to include the Singapore issues in the Doha-Round.55 This of 
course can and should be complemented by networks such as the ICN, whose potential 
should not be underestimated.56   
2.4.2 Convergence/harmonisation versus cooperation  
The second axis of discussion opposes substantial or procedural convergence/harmonisation to 
(enforcement) cooperation. Convergence can be seen as ‘the tendency of societies to grow more 
                                                                                                                                         
53  This may also constitute a reason for developed countries not to enter into multilateral negotiations. It was 
one of the causes of the failure to include competition issues into the Doha-round. Papadopoulos, op.cit., 
232.  
54  A partial solution for this problem could be the creation of networks of bilateral cooperation. 
55  For more on this issue, see Drexl, 'International Competition Policy after Cancún: Placing a Singapore Issue 
on the WTO Development Agenda', (2004) 27 (3) Wcomp 419. 
56  In this context one can refer to Slaughter’s concept of government networks as a solution to what she calls 
the ‘globalization paradox’, see Slaugther, A new world order, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004.  
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alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances’.57 It is thus a rather 
passive process. Harmonisation on the other hand can be described as active 
convergence. It is conscious, intended and works towards a predefined standard.58  
The risks, costs, and inconveniencies for companies of having to operate in a 
fragmented global legal environment with a great diversity of national competition laws 
are obvious. Substantial or procedural convergence would certainly simplify the 
international business environment, and make it more transparent and predictable while 
also promoting better and smoother enforcement, but there is too little agreement 
globally on what competition law should try to accomplish and how it should be done.  
Even though there is a global economy, nations ‘are at different stages of economic 
development and have different capabilities, perceptions, and priorities.’59 It is more 
realistic to start a process of convergence on a firm basis of daily intense cooperation to 
create trust between competition authorities and familiarity with other systems. 
Moreover, diversity does have benefits, ‘and openness of the channels for 
experimentation and adjustment has its own dynamic, pro-competitive rewards.’60 
Through cooperation one can learn from the coexistence of different competition laws 
worldwide, and in this way one is continuously stimulated to review one’s own national 
competition laws. A minimum harmonisation would however not undo this benefit. 
While Basedow stated in 2004 that a minimum harmonisation was the only realistic 
option at that time,61 it seems that the international climate is still not optimal to reach 
such level of convergence. Even though it is evolving rapidly, competition law is a 
young branch of law, and there is too much disagreement in the international 
community on the meaning and function of competition law, while national sensitivities 
continue to play a big role.  
Another argument in favour of cooperation is that differences in substantive law are 
not the main cause of deficits in the protection of competition – the main substantive 
problems being the regulation of export cartels62 and protectionist behaviour by 
governments – but the difficulties rather lay in the enforcement of competition law in 
the international arena.63 This indicates that the most urgent problems to be treated are 
not to be found in substantive law issues and therefore convergence should not be the 
main priority.  
                                                                                                                                         
57  Kerr, The future of industrial Societies: convergence or continuing diversity?, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1983, 3. 
58  Lohse,  ‘The meaning of harmonisation in the context of European Union Law – a process in need of 
definition’, in Andenaes & Andersen (eds), Theory and Practice of Harmonisation, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2011, 291.  
59  Fox, ‘Antitrust without borders – From roots to codes to networks’, in Guzman (ed.), op.cit., 267. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Basedow, op.cit., 329.  
62  This is what can be more broadly categorized as ‘the not my problem-problem’. Fox, op.cit., 275.  
63  Basedow, op.cit., 323. 
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On the other hand, cooperation cannot solve all problems. An example of the limits of 
cooperation can be found in the well-known GE/Honeywell case.64 This case 
concerned the aircraft engine maker GE, that wanted to merge with avionics and non-
avionics manufacturer Honeywell, causing concerns of dominance in the respective 
relevant markets. US and EU authorities cooperated closely on this case, but were not 
able to reach similar outcomes. The US reached an agreement with both parties, but the 
EU blocked the merger.65 Another famous example is the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 
case.66 Here again, while the US authorities approved the merger, the European 
Commission could not accept it. Finally, after threats of a commercial war by the US, 
the Commission cleared the merger following commitments made by one of the 
parties.67 This can be partly explained by the fact that the EU and the US, even though 
their competition laws are similar, have very different policy goals (even though 
convergence has certainly taken place), the US being focused more on the competitive 
process, and the EU on the consumer.68 Also political considerations, such as the 
creation or protection of national champions, cannot be overcome by mere 
cooperation.69  
Convergence as well is not a solution to all problems. Different factual situations in 
distinct national markets, for instance in the field of intellectual property rights, can 
result in divergent outcomes, even if the rules applied and analysis followed are 
similar.70  
2.4.3 Hard versus soft law and formal versus informal cooperation 
This discussion revolves around the level of legalisation and formalisation of the 
cooperation. One continuum is the one between hard and soft law. A generic definition 
of soft law includes ‘instruments that are not legally binding but can produce practical 
and legal effects’.71 Often the place of a certain provision along the continuum is 
determined by three characteristics: obligation, precision, and delegation.  Obligation 
measures the degree in which the subjects of the rule are legally bound by them, precision 
refers to the extent to which the rules unambiguously define the required or forbidden 
behaviour or stick to vague principles, and delegation refers to whether or not third 
                                                                                                                                         
64  Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market and the EEA Agreement Case No COMP/M.2220. General Electric/Honeywell.  
65  One of the reasons for the different outcomes is related in this case to the correctness of the portfolio effect 
theory: ‘a variety of different means by which a merger may allegedly create or strengthen a dominant 
position in non-overlap markets’. Papadopoulos, op.cit., 44-45. 
66  Commission decision of 97/816, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 19-20.; re Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., FTC, file no. 971-0051 (July 1, 1997). 
67  Ibid.; Basedow, op.cit., 324-25. 
68  Evidently, this statement needs to be nuanced.  
69  Papadopoulos, op.cit., 45. 
70  Competition Bureau, ‘Canadian perspectives on international competition cooperation’, 
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01087.html, accessed 30 April 2012.  
71  Stefan, ‘Hybritidy before the Court: a hard look at soft law in the EU competition and state aid case law’ 
(2012) 37 (1) ELRev 49. 
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parties are entitled to implement, interpret and apply the rules.72 A second continuum is 
the one between formal and informal cooperation. Informal competition cooperation 
can be described as the free and voluntary exchange of information and ideas between 
competition officials.73 Semi-formal and formal cooperation imply that the timing, 
scope, manner and/or content of the cooperation is determined in an agreement. This 
agreement can be binding to a greater or lesser extent, and may contain provisions of 
hard or soft law. Of course informal cooperation may lead to or may pave the way for 
formal cooperation, and formal cooperation may be complemented by informal 
contacts.  
One argument opposing hard law is that once rules are negotiated and formalised, they 
are difficult to change and adapt to societal evolutions, thus risking obsolescence.74 
Indeed, soft rules are more flexible in a rapidly changing environment and therefore 
seem more appropriate. Furthermore, looking at the majority of existing agreements, 
the international environment does not seem ready to accept the imposition of rules, 
and formal cooperation through soft law, or informal cooperation therefore are the 
leading trends today in international competition cooperation. As will become clear, 
even the formal instruments contain rules that are so vague or general that they can be 
considered as soft law (see section 3). On the other hand, not all aspects of cooperation 
can be regulated via soft law, for instance the exchange of confidential information, 
which requires stronger safeguards against abuse.  
This paper will mainly contribute to the third discussion, by focusing on the 
proliferation of formal and semi-formal instruments – containing harder or softer law – 
in bilateral competition law enforcement cooperation.  
2.4.4 Additional issues 
While these are the main axis around which discussions on competition law 
cooperation revolve today, some other elements can be added to the debate. One issue 
is whether cooperation should take place in full transparency, or whether competition 
authorities benefit from some degree of secrecy. Today, little information is available 
on concrete cases where cooperation has taken place and in which form this 
cooperation occurred. Another debate that might gain importance, is the one on 
enforcement versus compliance. While once again one does not exclude the other, one 
might wonder whether it would not be wise to invest on joint efforts to promote 
compliance, as cooperation on enforcement still seems troublesome today. 75 
                                                                                                                                         
72  Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter & Snidal, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 (3) International 
Organization 401.  
73  Papadopoulos, op.cit.,  47. 
74  Trittel, op.cit. 
75  In November 2011 the Commission issued a special Brochure for companies, entitled ‘Compliance Matters’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/compliance/compliance_matters_en.pdf (accessed 
November 2012).    
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3. DIVERSIFICATION OF MEANS IN BILATERAL COOPERATION 
This section includes a comparative analysis of some of the different legal instruments 
of the EU that are frequently used today for bilateral competition law enforcement 
cooperation. The analysis will be based on theory, meaning the content and legal value 
of the texts only, not on the practical implementation thereof. As the paper attempts to 
determine the goals and objectives of the agreements, and thus tries to discover the 
causes for the diversification of legal instruments, a theoretical analysis suffices, as the 
practical implementation is a consequence rather than a cause of the agreements. The 
practical implementation of the agreements might tell us more on the effectiveness of the 
diversification, but this falls outside the scope of this paper.  
3.1 Terminology 
Bilateral instruments between the EU and third countries that include competition 
provisions have mushroomed over the last years. Some instruments are vigorously 
implemented, others mainly exist on paper. Some are real international treaties that 
require a Council mandate to be negotiated, others are administrative arrangements for 
which the Commission is fully competent. The name of the instrument does not 
necessarily correlate with its importance and significance, and the importance of the 
bilateral relation is not always reflected in the size and complexity of the instrument.76  
The diversification in legal means to achieve bilateral enforcement cooperation and the 
confusion this can cause, already becomes clear when looking at the terminology. Aust 
stated that the task of trying to explain the terminology of treaty-names becomes 
increasingly complex, as the names of formal and informal instruments are even more 
confusing and changeable than in the past, and as they lack consistency.77 This adds to 
the confusion about the legal instruments used for bilateral cooperation. The analysis in 
this article is thus necessary to create clarity, as the name of the agreement does not 
give a clear indication.  
                                                                                                                                         
76  Valle, op.cit., 155-56. 
77  Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd ed, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007,  23. When 
looking at the glossary of terms of the Treaties Office Database, the definition of ‘agreement’ is one of the 
longest of the whole list, as it is described as a generic term, a particular term, and in the specific context of 
regional integration schemes. Treaties Office Database, Glossary, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/ 
glossary/glossary.jsp?internal=true (accessed January 2012).  Also, the Treaty Office Database contains only 
some MoU’s, while it does not include others, such as the ones on competition law (see 3.3). The reason for 
this is that the classification is based on the content of the agreements, and not on the name. Therefore 
some MoU’s are included in the database because they constitute legally binding agreements. Another 
example of possible confusion, is that a press release of the EEAS announced ‘Vice President Almunia signs 
cooperation agreement with Russian competition authority’, while in fact it was not a dedicated competition 
cooperation agreement, but an MoU, which is, from a legal point of view, a different instrument (see 3.3.2). 
Press Release, ‘Competition: Vice President Almunia signs cooperation agreement with Russian competition 
authority’, 10 March 2011, IP/11/278, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/ 
278&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed January 2012).   
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3.2 Bilateral dedicated competition cooperation agreements of the EU 
A first type of instrument used for bilateral competition cooperation, are the EU’s 
dedicated competition cooperation agreements.78 The EU has currently concluded four 
bilateral competition cooperation agreements, more precisely with the US in 1995 
(completed by a specific agreement on positive comity in 1998, and an administrative 
arrangement on attendance in 1999),79 with Canada in 1999,80 with Japan in 200381 and 
with the Republic of Korea in 2009.82 Negotiations are currently held with 
Switzerland83 and Canada. These negotiations involve so-called second generation 
agreements, that go beyond the first generation agreements, which will be detailed in 
3.2.1.84 
3.2.1 General content 
This section will briefly indicate the general content of the dedicated competition 
cooperation agreements and the types of provisions that can be found. A distinction 
must be made between first and second generation agreements. 
First generation agreements 
The cooperation mechanisms that are included in first generation agreements can 
roughly be divided into two types: case-specific cooperation, and policy dialogue.85  
After stating the purpose and definitions of the agreement,86 bilateral competition 
agreements generally provide, on a mutual basis, for notification of the cases that are 
being investigated by the competition authorities of one of the parties, that are likely to 
affect important interests of the other party.87 Also exchange of non-confidential 
                                                                                                                                         
78  These are bilateral agreements that are dedicated entirely to competition law.  
79  Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European 
Communities regarding the application of their competition laws - Exchange of interpretative letters with the 
Government of the United States of America, Washington, 23 September 1991, OJ L 95 of 27 April 1995, p. 
47; Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America 
on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws, 4 June 1998, 
OJ L 173 of 18 June 1998, p. 28.  
80  Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the application 
of their competition laws - Statement by the Commission - Exchange of Letters, Bonn, 17 June 1999, OJ L 
175 of 10 July 1999, p. 50.  
81  Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Japan concerning cooperation on 
anti-competitive activities - Agreed minute, Brussels, 10 July 2003, OJ L 183 of 22 July 2003, p. 12.  
82  Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning 
cooperation on anti-competitive activities, Seoul, 23 May 2009, OJ L 202 of 4 August 2009, p. 36.  
83  European Commission’s proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of an Agreement between the 
European Union and the Swiss Confederation concerning cooperation on the application of their 
competition laws, Brussels,  June 2012, COM (2012) 244 final.  
84  Hence the mentioning of Canada for a second time. Interview with Commission official, November 2011.   
85  Dieckmann, op.cit., 5.  
86  Article I EU-US agreement, article I EU-Canada agreement, article 1 EU-Japan agreement, and article 1 EU-
Republic of Korea agreement. 
87  Article II EU-US agreement, article II EU-Canada agreement, article 2 EU-Japan agreement, and article 2 
EU-Republic of Korea agreement. 
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information on general aspects of the application of the competition rules is provided 
for.88 Another part of the agreements deals with the cooperation on and coordination 
of measures taken by the competition authorities of the parties.89 Meetings between 
appropriate authorities of the parties to exchange views are mentioned.90 One of the most 
important articles deals with the avoidance of conflicts over enforcement activities. The 
term ‘avoidance of conflicts’ covers what is also known as traditional or negative 
comity.91  
Comity (as defined in general terms) is a concept under which extraterritorial 
determinations are often grounded in considerations of politeness or respect. [...] 
Specifically with reference to competition law, the principle of comity encourages 
states parties [sic] to take into account, in the enforcement of their competition 
laws, the important interests of the other party so as to avoid the creation of 
conflicts during their enforcement activity. In considering the other party’s 
important interest, the enforcing party applies the comity clause within the 
framework of its laws and to the extent compatible with its own important 
interests.92 
Traditional comity can thus be described as a passive courtesy procedure, allowing the 
parties to consider the other party’s important interests while they apply their own 
implementation measures.93 An evolution in these agreements was the inclusion of 
positive comity clauses.94 Positive comity, according to the OECD, implies that  
a country should give full and sympathetic consideration to another country’s 
request that it open or expand a law enforcement proceeding in competition cases 
in order to remedy conduct in its territory that is substantially and adversely 
affecting another country’s interests. In addition, the requested country is urged to 
take whatever remedial action it deems appropriate on a voluntary basis and in 
consideration of its own legitimate interests.95 
                                                                                                                                         
88  Article III EU-US agreement, article VII EU-Canada agreement, article 3 EU-Japan agreement, and article 3 
EU-Republic of Korea agreement. 
89  Article IV EU-US agreement, article IV EU-Canada agreement, article 4 EU-Japan agreement, and article 4 
EU-Republic of Korea agreement. 
90  Article VIII EU-Canada agreement, article 8 EU-Japan agreement, and article 8 EU-Republic of Korea 
agreement. Meetings are not explicitly mentioned in the EU-US agreement.   
91  Article VI EU-US agreement, article VI EU-Canada agreement, article 6 EU-Japan agreement, and article 5 
EU-Republic of Korea agreement. 
92  Papadopoulos, op.cit., 65. 
93  Treaties Office Database, Summary of Treaty, Agreement between the European Communities and the 
Government of Canada regarding the application of their competition laws, http://ec.europa.eu/world/ 
agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId
=288, accessed November 2011.   
94  Article V EU-US agreement, article V EU-Canada agreement, article 5 EU-Japan agreement, and article 6 
EU-Republic of Korea agreement. 
95  OECD, ‘CLP Report on Positive Comity’, June 1999, DAFFE/CLP (99) 19, 2, http://www.oecd.org/ 
officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAFFE/CLP(99)19&docLanguage=En, accessed 
February 2012.  
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This allows a particular problem to be dealt with by the authority best placed to do so.96 
In other words, positive comity is an active courtesy process, in which the parties may 
request the application of the other party’s competition rules, following anti-
competitive behaviour on that party’s territory, because it affects the important interests 
of the requesting party.97  
One of the most characteristic provisions of this type of agreements is the article 
stating that no changes to existing law are required.98 This clause indicates that no 
article in the agreement requires a party to act against its existing laws or change them 
as a consequence thereof. This is specifically important with regard to national laws 
governing the use of confidential information gathered by the national competition 
authorities. This confidentiality-clause is also an explicit part of the agreements,99 
protecting in principle the exchange of confidential information. Because of the large 
discretion given to the parties by this clause, it is said that the outcome of cooperation 
is determined more by policy than by law.100 This last problem can be partly solved by 
the conclusion of second generation agreements. 
Second generation agreements  
Second generation agreements go one step further and remedy one of the biggest 
weaknesses of the first generation agreements, namely they provide for the exchange of 
confidential information. Exchange of information obtained in the investigative process 
will be allowed and the agreements can be used as direct legal basis for the Commission 
to share information with the partner competition authorities, thereby superseding 
article 28 of Regulation 1/2003 and articles 17-18 of the Merger Regulation which 
normally prevent the Commission from sharing such documents with foreign 
authorities.101 
                                                                                                                                         
96  Dieckmann, op.cit., 4. 
97  Treaties Office Database, Summary of Treaty, Agreement between the European Communities and the 
Government of Canada regarding the application of their competition laws, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?ste
p=0&redirect=true&treatyId=288, accessed November 2011. The 1998 EU-US agreement introduces 
the concept of ‘enhanced positive comity’, creating a presumption of deferral or suspension where the anti-
competitive practices are more closely linked to the other party’s territory. UNCTAD, ‘Experiences gained 
so far on international cooperation on competition policy issues and the mechanisms used’, 17-19 July 2007, 
TD/B/COM.2/CLP/21/Rev.5, 7, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clpd21rev5_en.pdf, accessed 
February 2012.  
98  Article IX EU-US agreement, article XI EU-Canada agreement, article 10 EU-Japan agreement, and article 
10 EU-Republic of Korea agreement. 
99  Article VIII EU-US agreement, article X EU-Canada agreement, article 9 EU-Japan agreement, article 7 EU-
Republic of Korea agreement.  
100 Papadopoulos, op.cit., 78. 
101 Interview with Commission official, November 2011. Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 
2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 
1/1–25; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24/1–22. 
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3.2.2 Procedure for conclusion and legal value in the EU  
Dedicated competition cooperation agreements are concluded between the government 
of the third country and the EU. They can thus be considered as state-to-state agreements 
(although the EU is not a state), as opposed to agency-to-agency agreements.102 While the 
competition authorities of both parties will be involved in executing the obligations 
incorporated in the agreement, it are the governments of the parties that will conclude it, 
and it is thus the EU (before the Lisbon Treaty: the EC) that commits itself 
internationally.103 This was clarified during the conclusion of the first dedicated 
competition agreement in 1991 between the Commission and the US government, 
where the authority of the Commission to enter into the agreement was challenged. 
The Court of Justice agreed that the Commission did not have the competence to 
conclude agreements with third states.104 A joint decision of the Council and the 
Commission finally approved the agreement in 1995.105  
As the agreements are entirely dedicated to competition law, and competition law is an 
exclusive competence of the Commission, the member states are not involved,106 nor 
are other Directorate-Generals (DG’s). The negotiation of this type of agreements is 
done solely by DG Competition, leaving other more significant DG’s such as DG trade 
out of the process, and to a certain extent simplifying the procedure from an EU 
perspective, even though a Council mandate is still needed to open negotiations.107 
Approval of the agreement and authorization to sign the agreement is done by a 
Council decision, after a proposal of the Commission and consultation of the European 
Parliament.108 The legal basis for the agreements were articles 83 and 308 EC Treaty.109 
This corresponds with the current articles 103 TFEU and 352 (& 353) TFEU.  
                                                                                                                                         
102 The latter are agreements that are independently concluded between competition authorities. Damro, 
Cooperating on Competition in Transatlantic Economic Relations: the Politics of Dispute Prevention, New York, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2006, 12. 
103 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Case C-327/91, French Republic v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-3652 as 
cited in Zanettin, op.cit., 77. 
104 ECJ, 9 August 1994, case C-327/91, French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, ECR 1994, I-
03641, para. 43. 
105 The conclusion of an agreement should not be confused with its negotiation. Decision of the Council and 
the Commission 95/145/EC, ECSC of 10 April 1995 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between 
the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application 
of their competition laws, OJ L 95 of 27 April 1995, 45–52. 
106 Art. 3 (1)(b) TFEU. 
107 Papadopoulos, op.cit., 62. 
108 Council Decision 2009/586/EC of 16 February 2009 relating to the conclusion of the Agreement between 
the European Community and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning cooperation on anti-
competitive activities, OJ L202 of 04 August 2009, 35; Council Decision 2003/520/EC of 16 June 2003 
concluding the Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Japan concerning 
cooperation on anti-competitive activities, OJ L183 of 22 July 2003, 11; Council and Commission Decision 
1999/445/EC, ECSC of 29 April 1999 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European 
Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the application of their competition laws, OJ L175 
of 10 July 1999, 49; Decision of the Council and of the Commission of 29 May 1998 concerning the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States 
of America on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws, OJ 
L 173 of 18 June 1998, 26; Decision of the Council and the Commission 95/145/EC, ECSC of 10 April 
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Dedicated competition cooperation agreements are fully-fledged international treaties 
that are binding on the parties, which implies that the procedure of Article 218 TFEU 
on the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements applies, and that any 
breach would have to be addressed under international public law. However, the 
discretionary and vague nature of the obligations of the parties may prevent this from 
ever happening. The second generation agreements will provide more obvious 
examples of hard law.110  
3.3 Memoranda of Understanding: Brazil, Russia, and the Republic of Korea 
The EU has currently concluded four MoUs. They have all been concluded only 
recently. The MoU  with  Brazil dates back to 2009,111 an MoU with Russia was signed 
in 2011,112 and an MoU with China was concluded on 20 September 2012.113 A fourth 
MoU was signed by the Commission with the Republic of Korea in 2004,114 but the EU 
concluded more recently in 2009 a dedicated agreement with this country (see 3.2), as 
well as an FTA including competition provisions in 2011 (see 3.4). Because this paper 
has been written mainly before the conclusion of the MoU with China, this MoU will 
be only briefly discussed under 3.5. infra.    
3.3.1 General content 
When comparing the three MoUs, one can see that they only vary slightly in length, 
structure and content. Equal in all MoUs is the fact that they are based on the 
principles of equality and mutual benefit.115 
The general themes occurring in the MoUs are provisions on purpose and definitions, 
cooperation and coordination, assistance to be provided between the two sides 
(positive comity), avoidance of conflicts (negative comity), the organisation of 
                                                                                                                                         
1995 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Communities and the 
Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws, OJ L95 of 
27 April 1995, 45.   
109 Treaties Office Database, Summary of Treaty, Agreement between the European Community and the 
Government of Japan concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?ste
p=0&redirect=true&treatyId=360, accessed December 2011.  
110 Interview with Commission official, January 2012.  
111 EU-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation, Brasilia, 8 October 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/brazil_mou_en.pdf, accessed November 2011.  
112 EU-Russia Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation, Brussels, 10 March 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/mou_russia_en.pdf, accessed November 2011. 
113 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of anti-monopoly law between the European 
Commission (Directorate-General for Competition) and the National Development and Reform 
Commission and the State  administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. 
Brussels, 20 September 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/ 
mou_china_en.pdf,  accessed November 2012.  
114 Memorandum of understanding on Cooperation between the Fair Trade Commission of the Republic of 
Korea and the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission, Brussels, 28 October 2004, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/legislation/korea.pdf, accessed November 2011.  
115 Art. 1 of the EU-Brazil MoU, art. 3 of the EU-Russia MoU, preamble of the EU-Republic of Korea MoU.  
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meetings, provisions on existing legislation and confidentiality of information, 
communications, and some final provisions. The content is thus very similar to the 
content of the dedicated competition agreements.  
The EU-Republic of Korea MoU does not follow the structure or level of detail of the 
two other MoUs, although the main principles are the same. However, this MoU in its 
article 6 declares that ‘[b]oth Sides will do their best to establish a bilateral agreement as 
soon as the Member States of the EU will agree to initiate negotiations leading to the 
adoption of a formal bilateral agreement on competition.’ One can thus assume that the 
context and preparatory nature of the memorandum explains the difference in structure 
and content between the MoU with Korea and the other competition MoUs of the EU. 
3.3.2 Procedure for conclusion and legal value in the EU 
 MoUs are mere administrative arrangements concluded between the Commission and the 
competition authority of the partner country, and not by the EU and the foreign 
state.116 It is therefore a more flexible instrument, as it does not result in competence 
problems and is not a formal international treaty requiring a mandate of the Council to 
be negotiated. They are entered into by administrative authorities in view of 
cooperation with similar authorities of third countries, and are therefore concluded by 
‘bodies lacking the power to bind the state effectively at the international level.’117 
The voluntary and non-binding nature of the memoranda is emphasised by their 
wording. For instance, in the EU-Brazil MoU, article 19 explicitly states that the MoU 
is applied by the parties on a voluntary basis and article 20 underlines that the MoU 
does not create legal rights or obligations under international law. Also the EU-Russia 
MoU states in article 21 that the MoU is not an international treaty and does not create 
any legal rights or obligations. While the content of the MoUs is similar to the 
dedicated competition cooperation agreements, the wording of the MoUs is used even 
more to emphasise the soft character of the obligations, by using more expressions 
such as ‘where this is appropriate and practicable’118, ‘nothing in this MoU limits the 
discretion of the requested Side’,119 or the parties ‘will endeavour’.120    
3.4 Competition law provisions in Free Trade Agreements: the cases of South 
Korea and Columbia & Peru 
In its Global Europe communication,121 presenting a strategy to respond to the 
challenges faced by the EU in a rapidly globalising economy, the Commission stresses 
                                                                                                                                         
116 Interview with Commission official, January 2012.  
117 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, case C-327/91, French Republic v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-3641, 
3654 as cited in Zanettin, op.cit., 76.  
118 For instance in art. 3 & 4 of the EU-Brazil MoU.  
119 For instance in art. 8 of the EU-Brazil MoU, and in art. 10 of the EU-Russia MoU.  
120  For instance in art. 4, 10 &12 of the EU-Brazil MoU and in art. 6, 12 & 14 of the EU-Russia MoU.   
121  Communication from the Commission, ‘Global Europe: Competing in the world – A contribution to the 
EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy’, 4 October 2006, COM (2006) 567 final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0567:FIN:EN:PDF, accessed January 2012.  
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the need for more international cooperation and for greater convergence in the 
competition area as it announces its intention to include stronger provisions on 
competition in the new generation of FTA’s.122  
The most recent FTAs are the ones the EU concluded with South-Korea in 2010123 and 
with Colombia and Peru in 2011.124 They include competition provisions. Interesting is 
that with South-Korea there already was a dedicated competition cooperation 
agreement in place since 2009, which makes the context in which the competition 
provisions were included in the FTA quite particular. The FTA with South-Korea is 
considered to be the most comprehensive one concluded by the EU to date,125 
therefore, even though the context is specific, this FTA as well as the most recent one 
with Colombia and Peru, will be briefly examined. In the near future, the EU-Ukraine 
FTA will be very interesting to analyse, as is it the first of an announced series of so-
called deep and comprehensive free trade agreements.126 More detailed information is 
given here, as the competition provisions need to be contextualised in the greater 
agreement.  
3.4.1 General content 
KOREU FTA 
The general objectives of the KOREU FTA are stated in Article 1.1(2), and reflect 
fairly well the objectives of any modern FTA in general. The main objective is to 
liberalise (and facilitate) trade in goods, services, and investment, as well as the 
government procurement markets of the parties. Furthermore, the parties aim to 
protect intellectual property rights and to promote foreign direct investment. More 
overarching objectives are contributing to ‘the harmonious development and expansion 
of world trade’ and to sustainable development. Promoting competition is mentioned 
as an objective in the context of the economic relations between the parties.  
The agreement comprises fifteen chapters, one of which is entitled competition. The 
parties are required to maintain competition laws and they determine the activities 
restricting competition that are incompatible with the agreement.127 Definitions are 
clarified,128 and the parties are to maintain a competition authority, respect procedural 
fairness and the rights of defence, and will make public information available to the 
                                                                                                                                         
122  Valle, op.cit., 155.  
123  Free trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Korea, of the other part, Brussels, 6 October 2010, OJ L 127 of 14 May 2011, 6. (KOREU 
FTA) 
124  Trade Agreement between the European Union and Colombia and Peru, Brussels, 13 April 2011, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147704.pdf, accessed January 2012.  
125  European Commission, Trade, Press Release, ‘EU-Korea FTA – What’s in it for EU companies?’, 27 
October 2011, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=747, accessed January 2012.   
126  European Commission, Trade, Bilateral relations: Ukraine, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-
opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/ukraine/, accessed January 2012.    
127  Art. 11.1 KOREU FTA.  
128  Art. 11.2 KOREU FTA. 
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other party.129 Two articles deal with public enterprises and enterprises entrusted with 
special rights or exclusive rights and with state monopolies.130 The parties recognise the 
importance of cooperation and state that they shall cooperate through enforcement 
cooperation, notification, consultation and exchange of non-confidential information, 
based on the dedicated agreement of 2009.131 This implies some kind of reversed logic 
where the detailed agreement is concluded before the agreement setting out the 
framework for cooperation. Furthermore, it is specified in the FTA that in the absence 
of more specific rules in the dedicated competition agreement, a party shall, on request 
of the other party, enter into consultations regarding representations made by the other 
party, to foster mutual understanding or to address specific competition matters. It is 
also stated that each party shall endeavour to provide relevant non-confidential 
information to the other party.132 This is a very weak provision, as the parties do not 
commit themselves (they shall endeavour) while it only deals with non-confidential 
information. A stereotypical competition provision in FTAs is that the section on 
competition matters does not fall under the dispute settlement mechanism provided for 
by the FTA.133 Finally, what is distinct about this FTA is that in the competition 
chapter there is a separate section dedicated to subsidies.134  
FTA EU – Columbia and Peru 
Even though the FTA between the EU, Columbia and Peru is trilateral and thus does 
not fit perfectly in the scope of this paper, its content is still worth discussing as it is a 
very recent FTA and it possesses similar characteristics to the bilateral FTAs. This way 
it is relevant for a general assessment of this type of agreements. Similar general 
objectives are mentioned as in the KOREU FTA, although competition is mentioned 
more vaguely amongst them: ‘The objectives of this agreement are […] conduct of 
economic activities, in particular those regarding the relations between the parties, in 
conformity with the principle of free competition’.135   
As in the KOREU FTA, one title is dedicated to competition.136 Definitions are 
clarified and objectives and principles are agreed upon. The parties acknowledge the 
importance of free competition and dedicate themselves to applying their respective 
competition policies and laws. They agree on a list of practices inconsistent with the 
                                                                                                                                         
129  Art. 11.3 KOREU FTA.  
130  Art. 11.4 & 11.5 respectively KOREU FTA.  
131  Art. 11.6 KOREU FTA.  
132  Art. 11.7 KOREU FTA.  
133  Art. 11.8 KOREU FTA. For an analysis of the reasons why competition chapters are kept out of the dispute 
settlement mechanism, see Sokol, ‘Order without (enforceable) law: Why countries enter into non-
enforceable competition policy chapters in free trade agreements’, (2007) 83 (1), Chicaco-Kent Law Review, 
262-273. 
134  Art. 11.9 until 11.15 KOREU FTA. See also Jarosz-Friis, Pesaresi & Kerle, ‘EU-Korea FTA: a stepping 
stone towards better subsidies’ control at the international level’, 2010 n°1, Competition Policy Newsletter, 
78-80, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2010_1_19.pdf, accessed February 2012.  
135  Title I, art. 4 FTA EU-Colombia and Peru.  
136  Title VIII FTA EU-Colombia and Peru.  
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FTA, and they recognize the importance of cooperation and coordination.137 
Furthermore, it is announced that each party shall maintain competition laws and 
authorities and adopt appropriate actions, with respect to the principle of due process 
and the rights of defence. However, it is underlined that each party shall maintain its 
autonomy.138 The parties will make their best efforts to cooperate, and a party may 
request cooperation, but it is explicitly formulated that this shall not prevent the parties 
concerned from taking independent decisions. Competition authorities may exchange 
information, but this is limited by the restrictions imposed by their respective legislation 
– which again is related to confidentiality issues. A party may request that another party 
initiates the enforcement activities established under its legislation. This provision can 
be interpreted as referring to positive comity.139 Other articles deal with notification140 
and designated monopolies and state enterprises. There is no prohibition on these 
enterprises, but they must be subject to competition laws. However, only in so far their 
performance is not obstructed.141 Also technical assistance is offered, which did not 
occur in any of the discussed dedicated competition cooperation agreements or 
MoUs.142 Final provisions deal with consultations, and the fact that no recourse can be 
made by any of the parties to the dispute settlement mechanism provided by the FTA. 
The FTA states that the initiation of consultations shall be accepted, and that the fullest 
considerations must be given to the concerns of the requested party.143 There is thus no 
guarantee about the continuation of the consultations, which weakens the overall 
provision.  
Briefly stated, while there are some similarities in content with the dedicated 
competition agreements and MoUs, the obligations of the parties are far less detailed, 
and competition is seen more in the context of serving the trade relations between the 
parties involved, as opposed to the agreement serving the goal of closer cooperation 
and coordination between competition authorities. Cooperation is mentioned among 
the competition provisions, but also far more basic substantive obligations, such as the 
maintenance of competition laws and authorities are ‘imposed’ on the parties, and they 
explicitly agree on which type of anti-competitive behaviour is inconsistent with the 
FTA.  
3.4.2 Procedure of conclusion and legal value in the EU 
Similar to competition cooperation agreements, FTAs are full-fledged international 
treaties. However, they are negotiated and concluded under Article 207 TFEU. 
Additional legal bases of these agreements will depend on the content of the FTAs, 
which can be quite varied.  
                                                                                                                                         
137  Art. 258 and 259 FTA EU-Colombia and Peru.  
138  Art. 260 FTA EU-Colombia and Peru.  
139  Art. 261 FTA EU-Colombia and Peru.  
140  Art. 262 FTA EU-Colombia and Peru.  
141  Art. 263 FTA EU-Colombia and Peru.  
142  Art. 264 FTA EU-Colombia and Peru.  
143  Art. 265 and 266 FTA EU-Colombia and Peru.  
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What can make the procedure for the conclusion of a FTA more burdensome than for 
a dedicated competition agreement, is that in case trade in services or commercial 
aspects of intellectual property rights are included in the FTA (as is the case with the 
recent FTAs and the announced deep and comprehensive FTAs), unanimity of the 
Council is required apart from the consent of the European Parliament.144 
Furthermore, sometimes elements are included in an FTA that constitute a competence 
of the member states and are not an exclusive competence of the EU, which can cause 
FTAs to become mixed agreements.145  
Apart from the fact that the member states are then involved in the negotiation of the 
agreement, and must ratify it, it is also the case that DG Competition is not the main 
DG in charge of these negotiations, but DG Trade is. This DG may have other 
priorities than DG Competition, and even though consultations are held, may decide to 
agree on trade-offs and issue-linkages that DG Competition does not approve of.146 
Therefore, the negotiation and conclusion of FTA’s is a long and burdensome process.  
3.5 Dialogue: China  
Before the recent conclusion of an MoU with China, cooperation on competition issues 
with this major trade partner of the EU, took on yet another form. With China the EU 
entered into a so-called Competition Policy Dialogue.  
3.5.1 General content 
The EU-China Competition Policy Dialogue was created on 6 May 2004, but the initial 
agreement on its creation was reached on 24 November 2003,147 the same year the EU 
and China launched their strategic partnership.148 It was the first competition dialogue 
of this kind entered into by China, and was concluded at a time where China had 
recently adopted provisional rules on mergers and antitrust and had drafted a 
comprehensive competition law.149 The Declaration on the Start of a Dialogue on 
Competition by the EU and China as well as the Terms of Reference of the EU-China 
                                                                                                                                         
144  Art. 207 (4) TFEU.  
145  For instance, the KOREU FTA included a protocol related to cultural matters, making it a mixed agreement. 
‘Mixed agreements are agreements to which both the EU and the member states are contracting parties on 
the basis that their joint participation is required, because not all matters covered by the agreement fall 
exclusively within EU competence or exclusively within member state competence.’ Craig & de Búrca, EU 
Law - Text, Cases and Materials, 5th ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 334. This is a very basic 
description of what is in fact a very complex matter. For more information, see Hillion & Koutrakos (eds), 
Mixed Agreements Revisited, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010. 
146  On this matter see Damro, ‘Destructive Issue Linkages: The Failure of Multilateral Trade-Competition 
negotiations’, Antitrust Bulletin, (2012) 57(3) Antitrust Bulletin 563-589. 
147  Terms of reference of the EU-China Competition Policy Dialogue, Beijing, 6 May 2004, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/legislation/china.pdf, accessed March 2012.  
148  European Council Press Release, ‘14th EU-China Summit holds promise for a strengthened cooperation’, 13 
February 2012, EUCO 26/12, PRESSE 46, PR PCE 22, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127951.pdf, accessed February 2012.  
149  Font Galarza, ‘EU-China dialogue on Competition formalised with the signature of Terms of Reference on 
May 6 2004’, 2004 n°2, Competition Policy Newsletter, 27,  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/ 
cpn/2004_2_27.pdf, accessed February 2012.  
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Competition Policy Dialogue define as the primary goal of the dialogue the 
establishment of a permanent mechanism of consultation and transparency between 
China and the EU in the field of competition law, thereby enhancing the EU’s technical 
and capacity-building assistance to China in that context, while contributing to the 
establishment of smooth and sustainable trade relations between the two partners.150 
The terms of reference of the EU-China competition policy dialogue set out the 
objectives and scope of the dialogue, the structure, the content, provisions on technical 
assistance and capacity building, and costs.  
Further activities that originate from the dialogue are to be taken by consensus. Ad hoc 
working groups can be created and the dialogue should be conducted at least on a 
yearly basis. Focus is, as the name indicates, on policy dialogue, meaning that 
enforcement cooperation is part of the dialogue, but not its main aim. The exchange of 
views will take place on policy level, rather than on concrete cooperation.  
Some of the topics the dialogue enters upon, are  
‘[a]ntitrust law and enforcement, including an exchange of views on new 
developments on legislation and on the fight against international cartels, merger 
control in a global economy, liberalisation of public utility sectors as well as state 
intervention in the market process, [and] technical and capacity building assistance 
to China in the field of competition policy’.151 
The dialogue builds on workshops and conferences mainly and is focused entirely on 
competition issues.152 
3.5.2 Procedure of conclusion and legal value in the EU  
What is distinctive about this instrument is that it is a permanent and institutionalised 
set-up.153 As it is a dialogue however, this initiative is entirely political in nature and 
does not create any legal obligations. This may make the instrument very flexible, but 
what it can accomplish in short or medium term is rather limited. It is a good means to 
keep communications open, be a source of inspiration, and create a culture of regular 
dialogue, thereby trying to foster greater understanding, but for creating a structured 
framework for concrete cooperation and coordination it has little use. DG Competition 
is the only representative of the EU, China is represented by the National Development 
and Reform Commission, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, and the 
Ministry of Commerce.154    
                                                                                                                                         
150  Terms of reference of the EU-China Competition Policy Dialogue, op.cit.   
151  Galarza, loc.cit.  
152  Wu, ‘EU-China Competition Dialogue: a new step in the internationalization of EU competition law?’, 
(2012) 18(3) ELJ 18.  
153  Ibid., 19.  
154  Ibid., 18.  
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3.5.3 Conclusion of an MoU with China 
With the conclusion of an MoU with China, the next step in cooperation has been 
taken, even though the MoU is more limited than the other competition MoUs the EU 
has concluded (described under 3.3 supra). The goal of the MoU is to ‘strengthen 
cooperation and coordination between the two Sides in the area of competition 
legislation [own emphasis]’.155 Competition enforcement thus does not seem to be the 
primary aim. According to the MoU, the ‘ultimate aim is to increase mutual 
understanding and awareness of current and forthcoming trends and expected 
developments’.156 The MoU contains only five main articles, dealing with the scope and 
objective of the agreement, the content of the cooperation and coordination activities 
between the two sides, existing laws and confidentiality, costs, and final provisions. 
While the EU-China MoU is also based on principles of equality and mutual benefit,157 
and emphasises its non-binding nature158, its scope is much more limited. There are no 
provisions dealing with positive or negative comity. The main emphasis is on the 
exchange of views and experiences.159 Also technical cooperation activities for the 
efficient use of available resources is mentioned,160 and finally the exchange of non-
confidential information and direct coordination are mentioned, but without any details 
as to how this coordination should happen or in which form(s).161 The article 
concerning costs is rather confusing, as it states on the one hand that each side should 
cover its own costs, but on the other side it states that each side will provide support 
and assistance to the other whenever requested.162 In general, it is hard to see how this 
MoU will contribute to or go beyond the existing framework.  
4. ONE GOAL? 
The diversification just described, does not appear to be entirely based on a desire to 
tailor the agreement to the partner country, as there is little variation in both content 
and the de facto binding nature of the instruments. Therefore, the added value of the 
differentiation might lay in the fact that different goals are served.  
One should start the discourse on the goals of competition law by looking at the role 
competition law itself is attributed in the Treaty. Article 9 TFEU, that was introduced 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam as Article 127(2) EC, states that: 
‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into 
account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the 
                                                                                                                                         
155  Article 1.1 EU-China MoU.  
156  Ibid.  
157  Article 1.2 EU-China MoU.  
158  Article 5.2 and 5.3 EU-China MoU.  
159  Article 2.1 EU-China MoU.  
160  Article 2.2 EU-China MoU.  
161  Article 2.3 EU-China MoU. 
162  Article 4 EU-China MoU.  
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guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a 
high level of education, training and protection of human health’.  
These ‘policies and activities’ also include competition policy. This article should be 
read together with Article 3(3) TEU on the establishment of the internal market163 and 
Protocol 27 on the internal market and competition.  After the introduction of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the ‘shift’ of competition policy to Protocol 27 has been an issue of 
intense debate, as competition law/free competition is no longer mentioned in the 
Treaty articles as an instrument to achieve the internal market. To add to this debate164 
at this point however, would lead this paper too far. One conclusion that can be drawn 
from the before mentioned Treaty Articles is that competition policy should take into 
account different objectives that are not limited to those of economic nature. The goals 
of competition law attributed to it by DG Competition itself, are worth considering. 
The mission statement of DG Competition explains that competition is not an end in 
itself, but it contributes to the functioning of the Single Market by providing a level 
playing field. It also tries to achieve wider objectives, such as the promotion of strong 
and sustainable growth, competitiveness, and the creation of employment. The mission 
statement continues that DG COMP aims to strengthen international enforcement 
cooperation and promote increased convergence of different competition policy 
instruments, thereby shaping global economic governance.165 
Furthermore, DG COMP defines its general objectives to be the enhancement of 
consumer welfare by protecting market competition, to support growth, job creation 
and the competitiveness of the EU economy, and to foster a competition culture. It 
specifies that EU competition policy aims to pass on the benefits of globalisation to 
European consumers, by keeping markets open. But apart from passing on the 
benefits, EU competition policy also wants to protect European consumers from the 
harmful aspects of globalisation, by tackling international cartels, merges and abusive 
practices of firms of any nationality.166 
Refining even more, one of the so-called ‘specific objectives’ of DG COMP is 
described as ‘[p]olicy coordination, European Competition Network (ECN) and 
international cooperation’. What DG COMP pursues under the last part of this 
objective is to promote the international convergence of competition policy and to 
contribute actively towards this objective by cooperating effectively with the EU’s main 
trading partners and third country competition authorities, in a bilateral and multilateral 
                                                                                                                                         
163  The article reads: ‘The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development 
of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of 
the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.’ 
164  For a comprehensive discussion of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the place of competition law in the 
EU, see Steenbergen, ‘Het mededingingsbeleid en het Verdrag van Lissabon’, in van Ooik & Wessel (eds), 
De Europese Unie na het Verdrag van Lissabon, Deventer, Kluwer, 2009; and Parret, Side effects of the modernization 
of EU competition law, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011.  
165  DG Competition Management Plan 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/ 
comp_mp.pdf, 2, accessed January 2012.  
166  Ibid., 6-7.  
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context and by including competition and state aid clauses in FTAs to create a level 
playing field for European and foreign companies.167   
Thus, EU competition policy does not constitute a goal in itself, but serves a wide 
range of goals in order to strengthen and optimise the internal market. Why then, 
would competition law constitute a goal as such in the EU’s external relations? While 
there is no global Single Market to support, other goals can be served. An evaluation of 
an instrument by definition depends on the standard it is measured against. Some 
instruments may be better suited to attain a certain goal, but do not contribute to 
another. Therefore, it is interesting to outline some of the different objectives that may 
be attained through the diversification of legal instruments in competition cooperation.  
A first set of objectives that can be identified revolves around the improvement of 
international competition law enforcement, the creation of a global competition culture 
and a global level playing field. Dedicated competition cooperation agreements ‘provide 
for better structured and therefore more effective dialogue. A dedicated agreement 
creates a framework within which cooperation can be conducted.’168 An MoU basically 
pursues the same goal. It is not a binding international agreement, but considering the 
flexibility of the provisions in the dedicated competition cooperation agreements, both 
can be considered as soft law. Some legal commentators strive for these objectives to 
take priority. They claim that states need to accept that ensuring competition on the 
market should not be motivated by the public interest of a particular state, but is in the 
interest of the international community as a whole, and that therefore the application of 
national competition laws should not be based solely on the effect that anti-competitive 
behaviour can have on the domestic market.169 
Related to this set of objectives, is the aim of supporting the effects of trade 
liberalisation and making sure that they are not undone by anticompetitive practices. 
This is done in particular by the inclusion of competition provisions in FTAs.170 FTAs 
are also used, according to some legal commentators, to achieve what could not be 
achieved in the multilateral context of the WTO,171 because competition issues were 
too complex or went beyond the purview of the WTO. This statement is supported by 
what is said in the EU’s Global Europe strategy (see 3.4).172 These agreements may also 
                                                                                                                                         
167  Ibid., 35.  
168  Dieckmann, op.cit., 4; see also Press Release ‘Competition: Vice President Almunia signs cooperation 
agreement with Russian competition authority’, 10 March 2011, IP/11/278, loc.cit.  
169  Basedow, op.cit., 331. 
170  Woolcock, ‘European Union Policy towards Free Trade Agreements’, (2007) n° 3, ECIPE Working Papers, 
9, http://www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-working-papers/european-union-policy-towards-free-trade-
agreements/PDF, accessed January 2012.   
171  Ibid., 4.  
172  Cooper, Jurenas, Platzer & Manyin, ‘The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and its Implications for 
the United States’, CRS Report for Congress, 16 June 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41534.pdf, 
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help to improve the EU’s competitiveness, as put forward in the EU’s Europe 2020 
strategy.173  
Agreements revolving around or including competition provisions can also be more 
politically motivated, for instance in order to spread the acquis communautaire, in the 
context of the ENP, or in agreements preparing for accession. They may serve to 
provide impetus to a certain bilateral relationship or to stimulate involvement in and 
provide guidance to emerging economies with very young competition authorities. The 
Competition Policy Dialogue with China, for instance, may have contributed to such 
objectives.  Even though China is one of the major trading partners of the EU, and one 
would thus expect an FTA or a bilateral competition agreement between the two 
countries, the competition system of China is much younger than the US system, which 
makes the same type of agreement inappropriate for this particular relationship.  
These goals cannot be attained by the same type of legal instrument. Diversification in 
terms of scope, content, legal value and flexibility can help attain different aims. 
However, some questions remain unanswered. None of the instruments described 
above tackle some of the main obstacles to true international cooperation. None of 
these instruments, except for the second generation agreements, provide for some form 
of exchange of confidential information, or provide truly binding obligations. The lack 
of the ability to exchange confidential information, has often been recognized as ‘the 
single most important reason why more and better cooperation does not yet occur 
between national authorities’.174 Also the problem that positive comity is only very 
rarely used in practice is not solved, nor have these instruments provided a solution for 
divergences on substantial analysis.   
5. CONCLUSION 
The prospectus in DG Competition’s management plan for 2013 states that the mid-
term targets for bilateral competition cooperation are: no increase in first generation 
agreements, an increase from zero to two second generation agreements, an increase 
from four to five MoUs on competition law,175 and an increase from thirty-one to fifty 
FTAs containing competition and/or state aid clauses.176 The large increase in FTAs 
with competition provisions indicates that the most important goal for the EU, apart 
from the specific context of agreements with future member states or in the framework 
of the ENP or the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, seems to be the support of trade 
liberalisation. This follows the internal philosophy of the EU according to which EU 
competition policy exists to support the liberalisation within the Single Market.   
It is suggested by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) that voluntary cooperation between countries is more plausible if they 
                                                                                                                                         
173  European Commission, ‘Europe 2020’, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm, accessed April 
2012. 
174  Diane Wood, Luncheon speech, “Is cooperation possible?”, (2000) 34(1) New England Law Review 103.  
175  Which seems to have been already achieved by concluding the recent MoU with China.  
176  DG Competition Management Plan 2012, op.cit., 37.  
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share a perception of common interest and mutual benefit.177 This may explain on the 
one hand, the large measure of discretion left to the parties in competition cooperation, 
and on the other hand, justify the increased linkage of competition to trade agreements, 
where parties may be more willing to adhere to certain competition principles in order 
to create an environment that provides incentives for increased trade flows. Mutual 
confidence in enforcement capabilities and a shared commitment to upholding the 
competitive process are key to successful competition cooperation.178 In which way this 
can best be attained, will depend on the specific relation of the EU with the partner 
country, their level of similarity, in general and in terms of competition system, and of 
course the preferences of the partner country itself. However, these factors do not 
seem to be the main cause of differentiation of legal instruments. A more EU-centred 
agenda seems to play a large role, incorporating various non-competition related goals. 
This might explain why the agreements – even though much progress has already been 
made – do not go as far as they could to enhance the effectiveness of international 
competition law enforcement.  
Further research may analyse the strategy of other countries in cooperating 
internationally on competition law issues, and find out whether a similar approach is 
applied, or whether this differentiation is EU-specific. Other questions that remain 
unsolved are whether this differentiation may lead to fragmentation in the long term, 
preventing the EU from efficiently shaping the global competition enforcement regime, 
and whether it is really the EU that is actively shaping this differentiation, or merely 
replying to external evolutions and preferences.  
                                                                                                                                         
177  UNCTAD, ‘Experiences gained so far on international cooperation on competition policy issues and the 
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178  Ibid.   
